guarantees the real conditions ensuring individual rights. us the recognition of an individual right represents the exercise of private autonomy by the stipulation of contracts and the acquisition of goods or services from others. In this kind of State, the structure of rights assumes that women, racial minorities, gays, the disabled etc., fi t into the present scheme for 'natural' reasons, without taking into account the underlying problem. 1 e process of transformation takes shape in a number of forms: the move from formal competence towards substantive content; the use of 'recognition rules' and 'fundamental and structural values'; the increase in 'protection clauses'; the proposals for 'weighting clauses', 'identity', 'hierarchy' and 'compensation' guarantees; the constitutional development of 'operational rules'; and the extension of fundamental rights thank to 'rules governing the applicable law '. 2 ere was no formal mention of constitutionalized social rights until the Mexican (1917) and Weimar (1919) Constitutions, which were created according to a series of political, economic and ideological factors adapted to the industrial and post-industrial age. e precursors are von Stein (Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung, 1850) and his doctrinal mentor Heller (Rechtsstaat oder Diktatur, 1929) . e Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, a little later, is also worth highlighting because it includes the idea of the social State (articles 20 and 28), with demands linked to objectives that increase the reach of liberal States based on the rule of law, guaranteeing 'freedom', 'property', 'equality', 'legal security', and 'rights of political participation'. In this scheme, the public authorities are responsible for providing the citizens with the means which individuals need to develop their personalities and integrate socially, eliminating abstentionism.
In addition, it should be stressed that fundamental rights form an essential nucleus within Rules of law in a broad sense, and also constitute an essential legitimizing element, whilst demanding and requiring such a Rule of law. In this way, since the end of the 18th century, the theory of rights has off ered a new form of understanding political power and the dimension of the State. 4 According to the liberal theory of fundamental rights, such rights are an individual's right to freedom in the face of the State.
e freedom of individuals, from the legal point of view, precedes public authority, which has to ensure the means and institutions needed for its legal guarantee. e fundamental rights as rights to liberty are rules for the distribution of competences between individuals (society) and the State. ey delimit the sphere in which individuals and their social structures can be trusted to regulate conduct and organize their own maintenance. 5 e liberal concept of rights has its main corollary in Locke's statement: " e greatest and principal aim which men seek when joining a State or communities, and submitting to a government, is to safeguard their goods". 6 ese goods belong to all men in an equal way, so that we can say that they are individual. ey consist of life, liberty and property. e natural order unfolds in a set of innate and inviolable rights, and the State has been constituted to protect them. It has to adopt the most suitable organic structure possible, so that civil rights are the ideal framework for defending the sphere of individual sovereignty against any interference by the public sphere. Authors such as Bentham, Locke, Mill, Constant and Tocqueville stressed negative freedom, placing great importance on protection from the State, of a more or less radical nature according to each theory. For the neo-liberal tradition, represented by Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, Nozick, Posner and Tullock, the most important point is individual freedom conditioned by the freedom of the market, and defi ned as an instrument of convergence between effi ciency and justice. In this way, the role of the State is reduced to that of an arbiter, laying down protective or repressive rules, and making use of sanctions in the case of non-compliance. When there is a conjunction of legal freedom, the right not to be interfered with by the State, and the competence to exercise the right, the State cannot interfere with liberty. 7 us the legal, economic and political arguments 4) De Asís 1999, p. 43; Martínez de Pisón 1997, pp. 31, 32. 5) Böckenförde 1993, p. 48. 6) Locke 1982, 9, § 124. 7) Harvey 2005, pp. 64-87. are articulated in a cohesive fashion, postulating an extremely restricted role for the State. 8 According to this theory, in a liberal rule of law, not only is negative liberty what defi nes individual autonomy, but equality also becomes more important, at least in one of its aspects, since there is no doubt that the concept of equality and its practice are connected with fundamental rights: those of liberty (since they are rights to equality with respect to possible diff erences) and those of society (since they are rights to the reduction of inequalities). With regard to this, Mill stated: e sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. at the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi cient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. 9 us if there is an essential equality between all men, based on equal rights from birth, one can distinguish from this a formal equality or equality before the law, which is linked to a generality and abstraction, separate from personal, social and economic conditions which may originate from diff erences in the eff ective enjoyment of rights and freedoms which are regulated by law. is equality which establishes legal certainty, is given practical form in the application of the law, an impartial application of legal criteria to those who are objects of the rule of law, and in the content of the law, relative to the justifi cation and reasonableness of the criteria used legally to diff erentiate between individuals.
Liberalism aims to justify this equality on the premises from which its theory is constructed, i.e. from legal equality which is proof of a normative individualism. Accordingly, individuals are the subjects of legislation; and of an ethical individualism, which explains that they are in some way rational and capable of having plans for their lives, interests, and other pursuits, and that the satisfaction of these properties is a value. 10 e role which the State has to play corresponds to a neutrality in the face of individual 8) Martínez de Pisón 1996, pp. 242-244. 9) Mill 2003, pp. 57-74. 10) Rivera 1997, pp. 26 and 27. preferences, and the fundamental idea that liberties require an equal treatment for all subjects, men and women, rests on the concept of autonomy.
Arguments for Social Rights
A legal guarantee is a functional, relational and multidimensional reality that can be analysed within a legal system. As far as social rights are concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between the possibilities of technical and political realization. Technically they can be guaranteed, because the acts required to satisfy them would inevitably be discretional, unable to be formalized and would not be susceptible to jurisdictional controls and constraints. For that reason, the complexity of guaranteeing social rights is essentially political. e 'seconda ry guarantees' are related to the responsibilities of the judicial organs to apply sanctions or declare annulments, if there are invalid or illegal acts that infringe the obligations or prohibitions that constitute the primary guarantees. In this way, the question of guarantees means that there are rights with a greater degree of resistance than others depending on what the authorities have decided. Guastini 12 even goes so far as to talk of 'real rights' and 'presumed rights'.
e rights serve to limit the offi cial authority in order to add to its definition and to obtain the support and help it off ers in the form of benefi ts and services. In relation to civil society they serve to defend its members from the offi cial authority and from themselves, to be eff ective and surpass the natural state, to communicate and establish links between the offi cial authority and the civil society, instead of having the offi cial authority separated from society or a civil society that does not consider the offi cial authority. In short, the purpose of the entire public service must be to ensure the enjoyment of rights and promote them. 13 We draw the conclusion that the actions of the State which we have set out should be modernized and improved constantly, because, given the growing scarcity of many 11) Ferrajoli 2005, pp. 19-56 y 139-196. 12) Guastini 1994, pp. 133-134. 13) Peces-Barba 1999b, pp. 131-155. goods and having achieved universal social rights, in many cases the demands are excessive and impossible to meet. Given the problems that arise when determining when someone is entitled to State's action, the decision-making becomes increasingly more complicated. 14 e contemporary concept of equality has its origin in the creation of a legal and social order in which the independence of the individual could only be obtained by positioning it under the auspices of the legal power of the State, with the concept of independence being linked to a formal system and economic autonomy. As Rosenfeld highlights, the history of constitutional equality is the result of a long and diffi cult struggle against feudal status and privileges. is is a dialectical struggle divided into three stages. In the fi rst, diff erence is a correlate of inequality: " ose who are characterized as diff erent are treated as inferiors or superiors depending on their position in the hierarchy". In the second phase, identity is a correlate of equality: "If certain criteria are met, everyone has the right to be treated equally". Finally, diff erence is the correlate: "Any person shall be treated in proportion to their needs and aspirations". 15 Initially, social rights can be defi ned as those which establish a benefi t or service for holders of the right. e benefi t comes mainly from the public authorities but also less commonly from individuals. 16 ey take the form of rights to substantive equality, i.e. they demand a legal system which diff e rentiates according to real inequality, so that this equality is a condition of the exercise of fundamental rights.
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Given this aim, the problems related to guarantees of satisfying these rights diff er from those of other classes of rights.
18
In this respect, Bovero believes that, neither the constitutionalization nor internationalization of fundamental rights can be reduced to theoretical declarations based only on a rigorous distinction between them and on their safeguarding.
19
e contradiction between the declaration and the rights themselves must be resolved, in order to determine the proper system for guaranteeing the rights. 14) Donati 1990, pp. 51-81; Eekelaar 2000, pp. 9-28. 15) Rosenfeld 1996, pp. 161-192. 16) Prieto points out (1998, pp. 72, 73 ) that this does not always occur, since by its nature, the rights to strike and trade union freedom do not involve any provision, unless the public protection off ered for them is considered a provision. Other cases would be those related to those rights which restrict individual autonomy in employment contracts. 17) Ollero 1989, p. 14. 18) Ferrajoli 2007, pp. 108, 109. 19) Bovero 2007, p. 229. is indicates how pernicious it is if society regulates itself freely: administrative, economic, decisional, etc., techniques are essential to break the autonomy of the systems of State and society. is connection should be grounded in the development or control of systems without which one cannot live today, the security of those aspects which are vital for human life, and a range of social benefi ts which are guaranteed constitutionally.
e social benefi ts can be summarized as follows:
1. regulation of a minimum wage, revised according to changes in the economic situation; a policy of full employment. 2. care for people who are temporarily or permanently incapacitated for work. 3. career training, supported by a fair distribution of income according to the economic situation. 20 e term 'social policy' refers to the institutionalized mechanisms of public authorities, or preferential guidelines which frame State responsibility for the welfare of its citizens historically and structurally.
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In this respect, using the arguments of Barcellona to deepen our understanding of equality, there is a link between the transformation of the liberal idea of a State governed by the rule of law and the crisis of formal equality, together with the arrival of democracy as a substantive principle and procedure. Barcellona comments that substantial inequalities make substantive equality necessary, even though there is only the barest outline of a diff erentiated treatment of actual situations. e criticism which he makes is that "the principle of substantive equality is the negation of positive law and therefore, of the self-created character of imposed rules, precisely because it brings with it a reference to criteria of substantive justice and meta-positive elements" . . . "It is no coincidence that equality is a form of rule (equal right) and substantive content of the mandate (equality of diff erent situations). Nor is it a coincidence that formal equality (as a means) should exclude the relevance of substantive inequality, and vice versa, that substantial equality (as an end) should violate formal equality . . . Paradoxically, equality has to negate diversity (hierarchies) but should also prevent homologation (the homogenized society). Its duty is to square the circle". Garrido 2007, p. 111. 22) Barcellona 1996, pp. 52, 74. Linked to the main discussions which add the satisfaction of social rights and programmes of substantive equality, numerous solutions have been designed by various authors. Preuss systematizes the strategies into four groups: e fi rst suppresses distributive rights, which are a handicap for the market to use its function of assignation. is proposal is not admissible because the results would restore the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and run the risk of subjecting the working class to the market, making political dictatorship a real possibility. e second lays bare the conversion of substantive rights into procedural rights, prejudicial to persons who are not capable of pursuing their interests eff ectively because of lack of resources. e third is linked to what has been called 'responsible right', contained in article 18 of the German Grundesetz, which determines the loss of constitutional rights involved in an inappropriate use, i.e. a use which takes no account of the negative derivations of the constitutional system as a whole, which could devaluate legal claims. e fourth pertains to the 'teubnerian doctrine' of 'refl exive law' which calls for a constitutionalization of an organizing conscience of organizations in response to social demands. 
A New Comprehension of Equality for the Realization of Social Rights
ere is a basic legal equality to which we are all subjects in law, with corresponding rights and obligations. Formal equality is linked to generality and abstraction. Applied to rights, this means that we are all equal in terms of holding and exercising rights. e idea of formal justice satisfi es the value of equality in the way that subjects to whom rules are applied have to adapt to them. e fact that this equality is relative, depending on the criterion that has inspired the rule in question, the number of advantages or disadvantages to distribute, and the number of persons aff ected by the rule, does not alter the fact that compliance with results in equal treatment.
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Equality as a starting point is identifi ed with formal equality, which runs into obstacles which are indirectly protected by law, resulting from wealth or chance, which make persons with the same capacity have unequal opportunities. Legal equality is indispensable for acquiring real equality in a negative sense, given that the concurrence of legal discriminations limit 23) Preuss 1991, pp. 88, 89. 24) Bobbio 2001, pp. 17, 18; Laporta 1985, pp. 3-31. the objectives which have been set. At the same time, in a positive sense, it allows persons to go before the courts to challenge discrimination. However, formal equality is not suffi cient. It requires an eff ective application of egalitarian laws and laws which safeguard vulnerable areas: the principle of 'social equalization' compensates inequalities by raising or promoting disadvantaged people, or limiting or reducing the wealth and power of the most fortunate. e former case off ers positive benefi ts, and the latter negative ones.
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Given the idiosyncratic nature of equality and the fact that it starts with diversity, its evaluation excludes identity and similarity. Identity deals with two distinct subjects, and does not recognize elements which diff er. Similarity does not require diff erentiating elements to be disregarded. When we make a judgement regarding equality, we have to make a relational operation, making clear that something is equal to another thing with which we are comparing it. is point involves a value judgement which considers certain facts and inherent inferences.
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A case of equality of treatment would be when A and B are treated equally by C, if C gives the same benefi t or specifi c detriment to A and B. Whether A and B receive an equal distribution depends on the rule applied. e principle can be broken down into the obligation which the legal system has to prevent a priori any form of negative discrimination becoming positive, and implanting positive discrimination on cases which have traditionally involved situations of inequality. In this respect, it is interesting to mention the opinion of Ruiz Miguel relating to relative equality rules, determining equal treatment for a certain category of persons, inasmuch as this treatment is given to another category, and non-relative equality rules, determining the rights and duties of various persons without reference to the relationship between them.
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In substantive equality, affi rmative and negative judgements of equality are not absolutely symmetrical. e fact that two individuals, or classes of individuals, are substantially equal is interpreted as a duty to treat them in the same way. It is a legal policy directive aimed at legislators or judges. According to Guastini, this presupposition can be formulated as a normative proposition within the terms given as follows: " ere is at least one rule which attributes to 'x' and 'y' distinct subjective legal situations". e statement that two individuals, or classes of individuals, are not substan-tially equal is made according to the circumstances and the context of the discourse. We can use a principle holding to this postulate to express the guideline that there has to be diff erent treatment, and to express that the subjects, or a group of them, should be made equal. 28 e question which has to be addressed is what the foundation for substantive equality in the discourse of social rights is. e answer has to be rooted in the response to human needs, which are either themselves not negotiable, or are based on circumstances which are not negotiable, and which signify a manifestation of the capacity to overcome the limits of their existence. Graphically, Zimmerling argues that "N is a basic need for x if, and only if,, under the circumstances given in the socio-cultural system S in which he lives and given the personal qualities P of x, the non-satisfaction of N prevents x from carrying out any non-contingent goal, and thus from following his overall life plan". To sum up, a human need is identifi ed by the damage which its non-satisfaction produces for the person. e techniques of dealing with equality of substantive treatment are equality as 'equivalence' and as 'diff erentiation'. e former deals with the respect and protection of basic needs as an element whose rationality and foundation for rights is entirely acceptable. e latter consists in the disappearance of a privilege within its estimation as a fundamental right, insofar as: it is interpretable as equality of substantive treatment as equivalence, since the diff erential circumstance is not relevant for creating an inequality; it establishes a civil right which obliges the public authorities to satisfy a need which cannot be satisfi ed by privation; and it determines principles that demand to be dealt with later by legislation.
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On this subject, we wonder what distribution leads to adequate compensation, given that meeting point between the legal equality defi ned in legislation and the action of public authorities to achieve substantive equality is far from clear. As Gíménez Glück points out, it is diffi cult to be precise on "when the principle of equality is being complied with", "when formal equality is transgressed in order to achieve substantive equality", or "when 28) Guastini 1999, pp. 196-198. 29) Añón 1994, pp. 191, 193. 30) Añón 1994, pp. 265, 266; Contreras 1994, pp. 52-54. 31) Zimmerling 1990, p. 51; Bayón 1991, pp. 43-45; Martínez de Pisón 1998, p. 166. 32) Añón and García Añón 2002, pp. 153, 154; Peces-Barba 1999a, p. 291. the traditional outlines of formally equal treatment is being respected scrupulously". 33 us it is worth outlining the grey area between "diff erences" (characteristics which diff erentiate and at the same time make persons individuals) and "inequalities" (disparities between subjects originating in rights related to wealth and positions of power or subjection). Despite discrepancies, we note that the two concepts, "diff erences," and "inequalities," are linked to the fundamental rights of liberty, in terms of the equal respect to all diff erences, and to social rights, in terms of the rights to reduction of inequality. 34 ese are the reasons for which Rawls insists that the "basic structure of society should be organized in such a way that the inequalities in obtaining the primary goods of welfare, income, power and authority should be aimed at producing the greatest benefi t for the least advantaged in obtaining primary goods".
is implies that equality carries with it diversity. As an illustration, L. Hierro, following Haussman and McPherson, discusses equality of welfare, equality of resources or primary goods, equality of opportunities for welfare, equality of capacity and complex equality.
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From the progressive liberal perspective, Rawls bases his argument on a concept of justice applied to the basic structure of the political and social system, and associates it with two principles: a) that "each person participating in a practice, or aff ected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all". and b) "inequalities (as permitted and defi ned by the pattern of distribution of rights and duties) are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's advantage and provided the positions and offi ces to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all". 36 Rawls' plan is "to maximize the autonomy of each individual separately insofar it does not imply putting other individuals in a position of less comparative autonomy". For Nino, this reinforces the principle of personal dignity: the attribution of equal value to agreement between normal and adult individuals presupposes an equivalence between the possibilities of choice. us satisfaction of pri-33) Giménez Glück 1999, pp. 52, 53. 34) Ferrajoli 2006, pp. 82, 83 . One should not confuse 'diff erence' with 'inequality'. In this duality equality is based on diversity, which is opposed to 'homogeneity' and 'identity' (De Lucas 2000, p. 493) . See also Añón Roig 2001. 35) Hierro 2002, p. 96. 36) Rawls 2001, pp. 104, 105. mary goods determines individual well-being. 37 e work Political Liberalism not only introduces elements of justice, but also the objective basis for comparing individual situations of well-being between citizens. 38 Dworkin presents an alternative of equality of resources, in a much less fl exible position. Dworkin maintains that "given that liberal equality depends on economic and political mechanisms which reveal the real costs of opportunity of impersonal resources, an egalitarian society must be a free society. Invasions of liberty, such as criminal legislation which prohibits activities or styles of life that some people may wish to live or carry out, constitute invasions of equality, unless the need for them is justifi able, to protect an egalitarian distribution of resources and opportunities, providing security for persons or property, or for some other reason".
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According to Rawls and Dworkin, what is important is that there should be equality in satisfying basic needs allowing all persons to act as moral agents within a context, with an index which would postulate as a minimum that "justice would demand to satisfy all equally". Believing that no action which increased the distance from this minimum postulate would be justifi ed, although equality could increase overall, the principle of diff erence would justify all kinds of actions which would take place and bring closer to the absolute minimum people who were at a lower level, despite the fact that the package of measures adopted represented a greater inequality. L. Hierro argues that if justice and eff ectiveness are related, it would have to be seen if it is possible to set a limit according to the satisfaction of the basic needs of the most advantaged members of society.
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e formula "for any good X, the just method of distribution consists in dividing X into equal parts" is a summary of egalitarianism, and enhances the rules of "to each the same" and "to all equally". e criticism made is that, bearing in mind that equal distribution is not always just, a distribution which allows the exercise of equal rights is just given the problem of shortage of goods. It corrects the preceding axioms through the joint maxims that "everyone has a right to a minim level of life, and the goods should be distributed in such a way that equal rights are satisfi ed", according to the concepts of 'minimum level of life', 'quality of life', 'basic needs' and 37) Nino 1989, pp. 345, 346. 38) On the commentary of the work of Rawls 2005 , see J. Martínez de Pisón 1998 Dworkin 1993, pp. 89, 90; Dworkin 2000, pp. 75-131. 40) Hierro 2002, pp. 96-99, 102. 'levels of life '. 41 To defi ne substantive equality between individualism and collectivism as a basis for social rights, we have to maintain that it is based on 'equality to achieve a goal'. Substantive equality, and equality of substantive treatment, aspires to moral liberty, without forgetting the proper use of social, political and legal liberty and the rights which are based on it.
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In the words of Prieto Sanchís, the achievement of real equality by legal diff erentiations or inequalities is not obtained only through benefi ts. In addition, as we explained above, to know if something is equal it must be valued in relation to something else, using criteria which explain whether there are reasons for a diff erent treatment. e key lies in deciding which real inequalities are arguable, and whether they are important enough to represent a suffi cient reason when it comes to diff erent treatment. 
Final Note
To sum up, understanding social rights is a dynamic and complex question. is complexity can be seen in the role played within the traditional decision-making powers governed by rules of exclusive and excluding competences. To this scheme can be added civil society and international bodies which create and strengthen new relations. 44 Following J.S. Mill and Bentham, distributive justice is summarized according to the statement: "Between various possible distributions, a just distribution is that which proportions the greatest happiness possible to the greatest number of people". e problems arise because there are situations which oppose equality and which are not solved by utilitarianism; there are also inevitable inconveniences in an economic system in which supply and demand play a decisive role. 45 We accept the defi ning argument of L. Hierro on equality, saying that "there has to be adequate resources among all human beings to satisfy basic needs, leaving each to develop his life plan in a similarly autonomous and free way". 46 e tension between equality in practice and in law gives rise 41) Bobbio 1976, pp. 321-330. 42) Peces-Barba 1999a, pp. 289, 290; D. Giménez Glück 1999, pp. 45, 46. 43) Prieto 1998, pp. 81, 84, 90. 44) Barcellona 1996, p. 23. 45) Quintana 1994, p. 30-35. 46) Hierro 1995, p. 137. to a clash between principles. e problems that arise from these contradictions between theory and practice should be resolved using the techniques of deliberation. In answer to the question whether there is a general rule of preference, the answer lies in equality and not in diff erentiation. " ere is always a reason for equality. us equality should be proposed so long as some real inequality does not off er a reason allowing or, depending on the confl icting arguments, imposing a diff erentiating regulation". 47 ere is a complementarity between equal opportunities and the achievement of substantial equality which justifi es diff erentiated treatment as long as there is social inequality, so that minority groups do not remain marginalized. 48 e transcendent importance of health, food, education, housing and culture is clear and manifest. At other times there are needs whose relevance does not seem so clear. 49 In this case, Jori is right when he suggests that equality in legal capacity consists of "equal capacity to arrive at being unequal," as a way of putting into action "liberty as autonomy". As a footnote, the right to become and continue to be owner or debtor creates its guarantees related to the protection and ethical nature of the right to property or credit.
e frontiers between fundamental and ownership rights have yet to be defi ned. 
